

SECRET

Attal 3 a

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000500150004-1

D/DCI/IC 74-2394

2 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT : IC Response to Problems Andy Marshall Posed
on 27 November 1974

25X1 1. During his conference with you on 27 November, Andy Marshall listed three problems in the national/tactical field on which papers should be prepared for the Secretary of Defense. This memorandum describes those requests and suggests action assignments. While the questions which Mr. Marshall posed will be dealt with to some degree in the pilot study on national/tactical interface now under way under direction of [] that study will not be available until at least mid-1975. I suggest that an early response to the specific questions which were raised is called for because of Dr. Schlesinger's personal interest. The responses would be primarily descriptive in nature, indicating the existing and planned arrangements rather than assessing the extent to which confidence can be put on acquiring the desired information.

2. Current and Planned Use of National Collection Systems for the Support of Field Commanders

a. This question arose as a result of Dr. Schlesinger's visit to the Navy installation at Rota, Spain, and concern expressed there as to how the Commander, Sixth Fleet would be supported. As I understood Mr. Marshall, the Secretary of Defense is interested in normal peacetime support as well as support in crisis periods. Specific mention was made of the extent to which the [] system would provide "tactical" support.

25X1

b. This question might properly have been addressed to DIA rather than the IC Staff, and the response should involve DIA.

[] 25X1

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000500150004-1

This is DIA/NSA responsibility.

c. I suggest that CPAD be tasked to develop a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense which the DCI would forward outlining in summary form the extent to which various types of collector reporting and data are provided directly to field commands. This should not be limited to the Sixth Fleet, but should be a generalized description, in which specific mention of what goes to Rota can be used as illustration of the system. Separate sections should be devoted to SIGINT, to overhead photography, to reports from the clandestine services, to overt human source reporting, etc.

3. Tactical Warning to Field Commanders

a. This problem was posed in terms of how the Sixth Fleet would get tactical warning now and in the future. The specific illustration cited was how Sixth Fleet would be warned that Soviet medium range bombers were headed into the Mediterranean area. Mr. Marshall proposed that the inquiry should describe how the system would work in several different scenarios.

DIA and Navy.

b. I suggest that this particular study focus on the Sixth Fleet as an example of how the warning system would work. Again, this is essentially a Defense problem and might well have been posed to DIA, but since Mr. Marshall has asked the IC for an answer, it probably should be developed jointly by the PRD and the DIA. I suggest this be assigned to PRD because it has been so deeply involved in warning matters.

4. Provision of Non-military Information to Field Commanders In Crisis Periods

a. The briefings given the Secretary of Defense apparently stressed the desire for more reporting on political and related information on the countries involved during crisis periods. The problem involves determining what reporting is now being provided and what additional material--presumably both raw data and national reporting--could be provided. Since the FOSIC at Rota is part of the USEUCOM structure, the response should include indication of the support USEUCOM provides.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000500150004-1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000500150004-1

25X1

c. While the Sixth Fleet could be used as an example around which to build a description of the Intelligence Community response to this problem, it probably would be worthwhile to prepare a report which provides a more general description of the Community response.

d. I suggest that this task be assigned to PRD, although it may be necessary to utilize an ad hoc group of representatives from CIA, DIA, NSA, INR and perhaps the military services to develop the response.

5. Mr. Marshall mentioned no particular deadlines for the studies he requested. Once you have decided which elements of IC Staff should be charged with each task I suggest that an informal memorandum be sent to Mr. Marshall indicating that action is under way.

25X1

Chief, Coordination Staff

ILLEGIB

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000500150004-1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000500150004-1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000500150004-1